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REPRESENTATIVE EDWARD J. MARKEY*
I am pleased to give the Duke Law Journal Administrative Law
Lecture and to join the list of illustrious prior contributors such as Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia, Solicitor General Kenneth Starr, and Judge Abner
Mikva. I am particularly honored to be speaking on one of my favorite
legal topics, administrative law. Congressmen do not often have the op-
portunity to propound their views of separation of powers or constitu-
tional law. Nevertheless, I have always been drawn to administrative
law, ever since receiving an A in that class in law'school. Of course, the
dirty little secret about that exam is that all I did was try to put the
words "arbitrary and capricious" into as many different phrases as was
humanly possible.
In my role as a subcommittee chairman, I deal with the topic of
Congress and its relationship with administrative agencies on a practical
level every day. I have learned that one must walk a tightrope when
working with other branches of government. It is impossible to please all
of the people all of the time-no matter what you do.
The title of this year's lecture, "Congress to Administrative Agen-
cies: Creator, Overseer, and Partner" is particularly apropos. While
protective of our role as creator, members of Congress, out of necessity,
must remain vigilant overseers. But when appropriate, we also must act
t Duke Law Journal Administrative Law Lecture, delivered at Duke University School of
Law, March 5, 1990.
* Democratic Congressman from Massachusetts since 1976. Chair of the House Subcommit-
tee on Telecommunications and Finance for the Committee on Energy and Commerce. B.A., 1968,
Boston College; J.D., 1972, Boston College. I want to thank Representative David Price for his
welcoming remarks and also note my pleasure at being invited to deliver this Lecture by the Editor-
in-Chief of the Duke Law Journal for 1989-90, Gerry Waldron, my former staffer. Although we
never taught Gerry the joys of citechecking, I hope that his experiences in Congress helped prepare
him for the now distinguished career he has set out upon.
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as partners. I discuss the interrelationship among these roles and provide
examples of the problems involved in the search for Washington, D.C.'s
version of Truth-referred to in administrative law circles as congres-
sional intent.
Ultimately, all questions of administrative law, judicial review of
agency action, and the degree of congressional oversight revolve around
attempts to discover where the true congressional intent lies. All of our
congressional oversight activities seek to advance an administrative
agency outcome that most reflects congressional understanding of the
dictates of law.' In our system of government the non-legislative
branches2 all pursue the same goal-determining and ultimately follow-
ing congressional intent. The system affords each branch a great deal of
leeway to pursue its own view of congressional intent, and naturally each
branch seeks to assert its own perspective as much as possible.3 In my
opinion, from the vantage point of a congressional subcommittee chair,
some views should be granted greater deference than others.
In overseeing the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Fed-
eral Communications Commission, I constantly deal with the relation-
ship between Congress and administrative agencies, and have gleaned
several key lessons from these dealings. First, the issue of interbranch
relations and shared responsibility is not purely theoretical. Members of
Congress do not sit at committee meetings and debate the philosophical
niceties of Pillsbury Co. v. FTC4 or Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC.5
Nevertheless, at a practical level the congressional-administrative agency
relationship is vitally important. From a congressional perspective, this
relationship ensures or undermines implementation of public policy.
Second, Congress' role as the creator of independent agencies leaves
members with a feeling of paternal desire to maintain control of a newly
engendered agency long after the child has left the congressional womb
for the harsh world beyond. Agencies come into existence as a result of
congressional action,6 and the statutory bounds defined by Congress de-
1. See, eg., 121 CONG. REc. 29,957 (1975) (Remarks of Senator Dale Bumpers) ("Although
[the doctrine of agency discretion] in its beginnings was healthy, designed to prevent unnecessary
judicial interference with social policies adopted by Congress, it has long since exceeded proper
boundaries.").
2. I am referring, of course, to the executive branch, the judicial branch, and the independent
agencies.
3. See Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government" Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. Rav. 573, 596-640 (1984).
4. 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966).
5. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
6. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (providing for Congress to take actions "necessary and
proper" to carry "foregoing powers" into effect). Congress' power to delegate to other branches of
government those powers that Congress may rightfully exercise derives from article I of the U.S.
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limit agencies' freedom of action. Thus, given Congress' role as creator,
we may ask ourselves, why do Congress and administrative agencies
often find themselves at war with each other?
But this is the wrong question to ask, because agencies and Congress
do not always find themselves at war-and for a surprising reason. In
reality, Congress can oversee, in a vigorous fashion, relatively few of the
day-to-day activities of the administrative agencies within its oversight
boundaries. Congress is a stimulus-response body, and we need a lot of
stimulus before taking action to rein in an agency and direct it to admin-
ister the law in a certain way. Perhaps the most notable example of such
explicit guidelines came from my Committee, the Committee on Energy
and Commerce, which established the 1986 amendments to the
Superfiud law.7
This law was enacted after a long and sordid investigation of Rita
Lavelle and Anne McGill Burford, who had a "take-a-polluter-to-lunch"
attitude at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).8 During that
period, we used to joke that EPA stood for "Every Polluter's Ally." Af-
ter seeing the mess that a grant of broad discretion to the EPA created,
Congress stepped in and wrote very explicit laws. Indeed, at one point I
remember debating for several hours whether we should demand a clean-
up standard of 99.99 percent, or 99.9999 percent 9 (known affectionately
as the "6 9's" amendment). We felt that we had to make this decision for
the agency, since it lacked the credibility to make the decision itself.
Numerous practical constraints, including staffing resources, make
the 1986 Superfund Amendments approach rare. For example, probably
fewer than ten full-time committee professional staff persons in the
House and Senate oversee the entire field of securities, although the Se-
Constitution. See id § I & § 8; see also Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907)
(because Congress' power to regulate commerce includes the power to control navigable waters the
Congress may vest in the Secretary of War the power to determine if any structure over a navigable
waterway amounts to an obstruction to navigation).
7. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (1986) (codified as amended at scattered sections of, among others, 42 U.S.C., 33 U.S.C., 29
U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 10 U.S.C.).
8. See Shabecoff, Former EPA Aide Cited for Contempt by the House 413-0, N.Y. Times, May
19, 1983, at Al, col. 1; Shabecoff, Political Use of Toxic Cleanup Charged by Dingel N.Y. Times,
May 20, 1983, at A17, col. 1.
9. See H.R. REP. No. 69, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 100, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2835, 2881-82 (House version of 1986 Amendments to the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund) would have required the Adminis-
trator of the Environmental Protection Agency to set clean-up standards that "to the maximum
extent practicable, require treatment technology that provides ... a destruction and removal effi-
ciency meeting or exceeding 99.9999 percent").
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curities and Exchange Commission employs over 2,250 people. 10 Of
course, Congress can rely on the expertise of the Congressional Research
Service, the General Accounting Office, and the Office of Technology As-
sessment, but none of these are as effective as direct staffers. The ratios
are similar in the communications field or virtually any other substantive
area that involves administrative agencies."1 The machinery of congres-
sional oversight also includes numerous internal hurdles, which force
Congress to pick and choose its oversight activities with care.12 None-
theless, there are circumstances that demand a prominent and pro-
nounced congressional role well after the birthing stage of any agency.
How does Congress attempt to assert its views in the development of
administrative law? Ideally and most obviously, Congress announces its
views clearly and unambiguously in the initial crafting of a statute.13
Omniscient and precise directions would render administrative agencies
accountable to congressional intent when these agencies acted beyond the
scope of their rulemaking authority.
However, the scenario in which Congress provides precise, unchal-
lenged direction is more or less impossible in today's world. First, it is
practically impossible to anticipate all future changes in the external
landscape that affect implementation of a statute. Second, Congress may
choose to leave some issues unaddressed, either preferring to rely on the
expertise of experienced agency personnel to resolve difficult questions or
finding it easier to line up votes by obscuring some differences.14 Finally,
even if Congress did have specific and unambiguous intent, one must
never doubt the ability of regulators, litigants, and courts to find congres-
sional ambiguity in any conceivable situation.
10. U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, FEDERAL CIVILIAN WORKFORCE STATIS-
TICS: EMPLOYMENT AND TRENDS AS OF MARCH 1990, at 19, table 2.
11. See id. at 16-20.
12. Sea ag., McCubbins & Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus
Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SC. 165, 165-66, 176 (1984) (distinguishing between "police patrol"
oversight, in which the legislature constantly monitors administrative activity, and "fire alarm" over-
sight, in which the legislature waits for interested parties to sound alarms; latter method more effec-
tive and less expensive); Weingast & Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?
Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. EcON. 765, 777-79 (1983)
(suggesting that congressional priorities shift as the individual make-up of the oversight committees
changes).
13. See, eg., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (where Congress has
directly addressed the question at issue, there is no issue as to agency or judicial interpretation of the
statute). Chevron mandated that Congress express its views clearly ("unambiguously") or risk that
the federal courts would defer to reasonable executive branch constructions of congressional
enactments.
14. See Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of Law, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511,




The dilemma of found ambiguity is most obvious in Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. NRDC.' 5 In last year's Administrative Law Lecture, Justice
Scalia focused on that seminal case. The Justice defended the unani-
mous decision that held courts must give deference to "reasonable"
agency interpretations when a statute is silent or ambiguous on the spe-
cific issue. 16 From a congressional viewpoint, the problem with Justice
Scalia's analysis is that the scope of Chevron's applicability hinges en-
tirely on how one interprets "ambiguity." Solving a statutory construc-
tion problem created by too much ambiguity through the use of an
undefined notion of "ambiguity" is nonsensical. Instead of shedding
light on the problem of statutory construction, an "ambiguity" test
threatens to cloak the problem in a further layer of ambiguity. Thus, I
am afraid that we are destined to live in a world in which Congress is
often frustrated by inconsistent application of what Congress views as
unambiguous pronouncements of law.
Given the likelihood of perceived ambiguity in congressional enact-
ments, there is great opportunity for agencies to wander far afield of con-
gressional intent. But in response to agency intransigence, Congress may
utilize a variety of tactics to press its own views on agencies. For exam-
ple, Congress can pass a new law and more clearly state its position on an
issue previously seen as unaddressed or ambiguous. This method is not
always effective or desirable. Often there are ponderous difficulties in
trying to enact a new statute. Further, the demon of ambiguity may once
again rear its ugly head.
Short of passing an endless series of ever-less ambiguous statutes,
Congress can invoke a range of measures to inject its views into the ad-
ministrative law process. For example, Congress can use its power over
the budget to effect changes in the spending of appropriated money.' 7
Congress can hold oversight hearings to increase public pressure on a
wayward agency and impress upon the agency's staff the importance of
following Congress' views. At a lower level, Congress can inundate
agencies with letters that press its point of view. Alternatively, these can
be approached through more informal personal contact between staff on
the Hill and agency staff and between members of Congress And agency
heads. All of this activity moves an agency toward the achievement of
Congress' own view of congressional intent.
15. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
16. See Scalia, supra note 14, at 521.
17. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 and § 9, cl. 7. See generally Stith, Congress' Power of the
Purse, 97 YALE L. 1343, 1360 (1988) ("Appropriations limitations... constitute a low cost vehicle
for effective legislative control over executive activity.").
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In general, Congress does not relish warfare with administrative
agencies. I know from personal experience that mutual cooperation in
the pursuit of fimctional policy goals is to be preferred over bitter con-
flict. Nevertheless, the legislative branch and administrative agencies
have battled during the last decade. 18 These encounters have cut right to
the core of both the ability and desire of the independent agencies to
honor the congressional intentions that underlie many laws.
In Congress a largely bipartisan consensus exists on the need for the
existence of independent agencies. Yet even that consensus has been
challenged by the administrative actions of the last decade.
Congress draws congressional committees along certain functional
lines. For instance, the Ways and Means Committee taxes everybody.
The Appropriations Committee spends all the money. The Energy and
Commerce Committee regulates everybody.19 And so whether it be the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Security and Exchange Commis-
sion, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Com-
mission, or the Food and Drug Administration, just to name a few,
almost all regulation in some manner, shape or form, comes under the
jurisdiction of the Energy and Commerce Committee. 20
I have had the personal responsibility for overseeing the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission as
a Chair of the Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power, and
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Communica-
tions Commission as Chair of the Subcommittee on Telecommunications
and Finance. So, I have enjoyed an opportunity to examine these agen-
cies closely. My position also has afforded me an opportunity to make
more general observations as to what has been going on since 1976, when
I was first elected to Congress. Throughout the 1960s and into the
1970s, there was a bipartisan consensus on the role of, and need for, reg-
ulations issued by the independent agencies. Regulation was recognized
as a vehicle through which government could ensure a certain level of
18. See infra notes 31-65 and accompanying text. Citizens also have joined the fray in an
attempt to force agencies to comply with congressional intent. However, those citizen efforts often
have not fared well in the courts. See, ag., Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 866 F.2d
433, 436-38 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (litigants lacked standing to pursue judicial review in situations in
which agency allegedly expanded regulatory deadline contrary to congressional intent).
19. Specific jurisdiction of the Energy and Commerce Committee is provided by the Rules of
the House of Representatives. HousE OF REPRESENTATIVS, RuLEs OF THE HOUSE OF REPRE-
SENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. H-940-2, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 3-9 (1990) (rules x(1)(h), x(2), x(3)(h),
x(4)Cf)-(i)).
20. This is in some part a by-product of having Sam Rayburn and John Dingell, among others,
as chairmen of your committee. The Committee historically has been quite fortunate often to have
the most able (and powerful) members of the House as its chair. This has helped ensure a healthy
jurisdiction for the Energy and Commerce Committee.
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safety, security, and stability in the economy and the marketplace.21
These are hardly the goals of left-wing, granola-chomping liberals. In
fact, I believe that these goals reflect conservative values: One should
remember that the EPA was created by the Nixon Administration.22
However, by the late 1970s a consensus formed around the belief that
there was too much government regulation and that some reassessment
was called for-and this helped to put Ronald Reagan in the White
House.
President Carter actually began deregulation with the trucking and
airline industries. It is important to remember, however, that President
Carter's goal was to promote competition.23 When he deregulated, it was
to reduce barriers to market entry, while simultaneously maintaining
consumer protection and antitrust goals. President Reagan's deregu-
latory goal, on the other hand, went far beyond President Carter's, and
was contrary to the bipartisan consensus that had formed with regard to
where regulation was needed. Instead of recognizing that a small
amount of overregulation existed, President Reagan came in and effec-
tively said that all regulation was bad.24 The Reagan Administration ad-
vocated deregulation without even the desire to increase competition. It
was the pursuit of deregulation for deregulation's sake in a deregulatory
feeding frenzy. In fact, it was more than deregulation. Reagan at-
tempted to deny any legitimate role for government in ensuring mini-
mum marketplace standards for safety, health, and competition.
The independent agencies,- as well as cabinet level departments, be-
came arenas for waging the deregulation war. It was fought primarily
21. See C. ScHuLTzE, THE PUBLIC USE OF THE PRIVATE INTEREsT 2 (1977) ("During the
1960s the belief took hold that some kind of... federal regulatory agency could be designed to deal
with almost any social or economic problem.").
22. The EPA was established in 1970 by President Nixon in Reorg. Plan no. 3 of 1970, 3
C.F.R. 1072 (1966-1970), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 app. at 965-68 (1988).
23. See 3. CARTER, KEEPING FAI: MEMOIRS OF A PRESIDENT 69 (1982). According to
former President Carter, his administration's
first major test in Congress [came in the form of] a bill authorizing the President to address
the problem of the federal bureaucracy-its complexity, its remoteness when people needed
help, its intrusiveness when they wanted to be left alone, and its excessive regulation of the
major industries to the detriment of consumers.
Id see also Senate Passes Trucking Bill N.Y. Times, June 21, 1980, § 1, at 30, col. 4; Shiftin, Far-
Reaching Changes in Store for Airline" Air Deregulation Victory Surprises Backer" Winds of Change
Sweep Airlines, Wash. Post, Oct. 29, 1978, at Fl, col. 1.
24. See D. STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLrncs: How THE REAGAN REVOLUTION
FAILED 8-9 (1986) (describing the vision of the Reagan plan as resting on the productive potential of
free men in free markets); see also Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982) (setting forth
numerous requirements to which agencies must adhere when promulgating new regulations and
reviewing existing regulations, among the requirements were the preparation of cost-benefit analyses,




with three weapons. First, the fox was allowed to guard the henhouse:
The Administration appointed people who wished to demolish quickly
the regulatory structure that had been put in place during the first 200
years of the Republic.25 Second, the grim reaper was brought into the
halls of government: The Administration set up the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget and the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief
to put a stranglehold on regulations already in place and to prevent any
new regulations from seeing the light of day.26 Third, the starvation diet
was imposed: The Administration simply denied the agencies the money
and staff needed to do their jobs. 27 Let me give some examples of how
each of these weapons was used. Many people may not remember James
Edwards, a South Carolina politician and a former dentist, who was
named President Reagan's first Secretary of Energy. At a hearing in De-
cember of 1981,28 Senator John Glenn asked Edwards whether, in being
named Secretary of Energy, he had in fact been given the job of doing
away with the Department of Energy. "Yes sir, I have," responded the
dentist.29 Glenn asked Edwards when he thought he could accomplish
the task. Edwards replied (this is the future Secretary of Energy speak-
ing), that he hoped a bill would be passed very rapidly so "maybe about
April or May I could get back to South Carolina for spring fishing."'30
When told he was overly optimistic, Edwards said cheerily, "The fishing
is good in June or July, too Senator. '31 Edwards never succeeded. And
eventually Reagan gave up and stopped trying to abolish the Department
of Energy. But as it turned out, the Administration's regulatory policy
became the equivalent of a "gone fishing" sign hanging on the door of
most independent agencies and some departments.
Another anecdote also illustrates how the Administration used both
the power of appointment and the power of the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) in its attempt to cripple an independent agency. Dr.
John Hernandez eventually became Deputy Administrator of the EPA, 32
but was first interviewed for the top job by two men from David Stock-
25. For example, it was the Reagan Administration that appointed people like James Watt and
Samuel Pierce to high public office.
26. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982).
27. For discussion of Edwin Gray's testimony before the Senate that budget cuts left the Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) unable to perform its regulatory duties, see
infra notes 46-49.
28. Possibility of De Facto Dismantlement of Dept of Energy Functions: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Government Processes of the Senate Comm. on Gov-
ernmental Affairs; 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1981).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 55.
31. Id.
32. See A. BuRwoRD & J. GREENYA, ARE You TOUGH ENOUGH? 83 (1986).
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man's office at OMB.33 Hernandez' description of his meeting with two
people from OMB (as reported to Anne McGill Burford), who were to
decide on his worthiness for appointment at the EPA reveals the Reagan
Administration's motives:
My meeting was with Glen Schleede, the number three man at OMB,
and Fred Khedouri, OMB's budget director for the EPA. I went into
that interview very cautiously because I knew that these people wanted
to make a lot of major cuts at EPA. So I was quite reluctant to say
anything that I didn't believe in, in way of philosophy or approach. I
was absolutely terrified of becoming the head of EPA and all that mess
it was in, so it was in the forefront of my mind all during that meeting
that anything I said to those guys I would have to live with if I became
the Administrator.
And, finally, at one point, Fred Khedouri leaned over in his chair,
and kind of quiet like, but dead serious, asked "Would you be willing
to bring EPA to its knees?"
I was so startled that I kind of just laughed, as if I couldn't believe
he said that. But he had said it, and I just demurred.
And when Anne was selected as head of EPA instead of me, I was
very much relieved. 34
The EPA saga that subsequently unfolded illustrated the cavalier disre-
gard for common sense and the public good that the Administration dis-
played when it came to regulation. It could also mean a cavalier
disregard for the law-witness the example of Rita Lavelle.35 Even after
the EPA fiasco, the Administration continued to violate the first law of
holes, which is that when you find yourself in one, you stop digging. In
fact, its deregulatory policies could have dug a bottomless pit.
Part two of the grim reaper involved the Presidential Task Force on
Regulatory Relief. Today, President Bush is the self-proclaimed "envi-
ronmental president" and has made re-authorization of the Clean Air
Act a top administration priority.3 6 However, Vice-President Bush,
33. See id.
34. Id. at 83-84. This is Anne McGill Burford's version of what took place at the meeting.
35. Lavelle, who served as EPA's assistant administrator in charge of waste programs, was
convicted by a federal grand jury of perjuring testimony before a congressional committee investigat-
ing misconduct at the EPA. Lavelle lied about her participation in matters affecting her former
employer, Aerojet-General Corporation. The investigation found that the EPA's toxic waste man-
agement program had been undermined by misconduct such as favoritism to industries and politi-
cians, and unwillingness to use available funds to clean up toxic sites. Anne McGill Burford and
twenty other EPA administrators resigned under pressure from the committee's investigation. See
Shabecoff, Lavelle Verdict EPA. Trial Over, But Not Inquiries& N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1983, at A9,
col. 1; Shabecoff, Jury in RPA Case Finds Lavelle Guilty of Pejury, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1983, at
Al, col. 1.
36. See Berke, Oratory of Environmentalism Becomes the Sound of Politic; N.Y. Times, Apr.
17, 1990, at Al, col. 1. On November 15, 1990, the new Clean Air Act became law. Clean Air Act,
Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399.
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while supervising the deregulatory task force in 1981, allowed California
oil refineries and other industries to operate despite Clean Air Act bans
on new sources of air pollution in poor air quality areas.37 In 1981, the
task force also decided to relax EPA requirements on pollution by mu-
nicipal sewerage systems and regulations of dangerous pesticides.38 The
task force decided to allow vehicles to emit greater amounts of carbon
monoxide and other dangerous pollutants into our air,39 and it relaxed a
rule that would have limited worker's exposure to lead.4° This is the
environmental legacy of the Task Force on Regulatory Relief.
Now let me turn to the Reagan Administration's third weapon in
the war on regulation-the cutting of staff and funding at independent
agencies. Edwin Gray, prior to becoming head of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), had a policy disagreement with the associ-
ate director of the 0MB in the early days of the deregulatory drive in
1981.41 Gray notified the OMB about the potential problems that FSLIC
faced with savings and loans and banks throughout the country. He told
the 0MB that FSLIC desperately needed more examiners in the Federal
Home Loan Banks. Gray was told by the 0MB that he obviously did
not understand the administration's policy of deregulation-that policy
meant reducing, not increasing, the size of the examination staf. 42 Even-
37. On March 25, 1981, Vice President Bush announced that the Presidential Task Force
would relax EPA pollution regulations for the timber industry, municipal sewerage systems, and
certain dangerous pesticides. See Farnsworth, EPA Plans to Ease Rules on Clean Air, Vice President
Says, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 1; Letter from Edward J. Markey to the editors, Mr.
Bush on the Environment, Wash. Post, Sept. 8, 1988, at A20, col. 4; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7508
(1988) (describing statutory requirements for state planning to achieve uniform ambient air quality
in nonattainment areas).
38. Behr and Omang, White House Targets 27More Regulations for Review: More Regulations
Target of Administrative Review, Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 1981, at Al, col. 2. See Regulatory Reform
Act" Hearings on H.R. 2327Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Government Relations of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 3 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2739, 2751 (1984) [hereinafter Regula.
tory Reform Act].
39. Regulatory Reform Act, supra note 38, at 2738-39 (allowing waivers for higher nitrogen
oxide emissions from diesel manufacturers, lowered limit on carbon monoxide emissions from 3.4
grams per mile to 7 grams per mile, relaxed limits on solvents that can be released from automobile
paint shops); id. at 2749-51 (proposing rules relaxing EPA standards on hydrocarbon and carbon
monoxide emissions from heavy trucks; eliminating the high altitude requirement for auto emissions;
relaxing the acceptable failure rate for assembly line testing of truck emissions; relaxing the particu-
late emissions standards for diesel automobiles; excluding methane from calculations of hydrocarbon
emissions).
40. See id at 2758 (relaxed an OSHA regulation specifying permissible levels of occupational
exposure to lead by extending compliance time to 2.5 years, by requiring only feasible controls and
by exempting certain industries).
41. S. Pizzo, M. FRiCKER & P. MUOLO, INSIDE Jon 179-80 (1989).
42. The Impact of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Reductions on the Supervisory and Regulatory
Roles of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the National Credit Union Administration: Hearing before
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tually, the OMB was generous enough to offer FSLIC thirty-nine new
examiners nationwide just as massive deregulatory policies in the Federal
Savings and Loan Bank area were being introduced.43 Unfortunately, as
we found out by 1986, FSLIC needed more than 750 new examiners.44
As a result, the nation inherited a legacy of disaster-runaway financial
collapse with the government incapable of overseeing and responding ad-
equately. Consequently, last year Congress was forced to enact one of
the most expensive government/taxpayer bailouts in history.45
When the FSLIC experience is compared to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) experience the resemblance is striking. Wall
Street was booming through the 1980s. Since 1980, the number of regis-
tered investment companies has increased an estimated 146% and the
number of registered investment advisers has increased an estimated
217%.46 The number of registered broker-dealer firms has increased an
estimated 88% and sales on the United States Securities exchanges have
increased 157%. 47 But as you might expect, complaints to the SEC also
increased. 4 In 1987, the SEC received 40,000 complaints from disgrun-
tled investors-a 230% increase over the number received in 1982. 49
And yet throughout the 1980s, the SEC consistently was given fewer em-
ployees than it needed to fulfill its mandate. 50 If activity increases in the
marketplace because of deregulation and fewer personnel are on duty to
the Subcomm. on General Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs; 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 52-56 (1986) (prepared statement of Edwin J. Gray, Chairman of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board) (reporting that proposed Fiscal Year 1987 budget cuts would
result in immediate staff reductions, seriously impairing the effectiveness of the Bank Board) [herein-
after Impact on FDIC]. See Edwin Gray on the S & L Crisis.: 'his was a Self-Inflicted Disaster,'
Wash. Post., Oct. 9, 1988, at H9, col. 1 (describing Gray's fight with OMB to obtain more bank
examiners) [hereinafter S & L Crisis]; O'Shea, Taxpayers Target of Financial 'Time Bomb,' Chicago
Trib., Sept. 25, 1988 at 1, col. 3 (describing OMB's stiff resistance to proposal for more examiners);
Trigaux & Barnes, Gray Requests Increased Aid for Bank Board, AM. BANKER, Feb. 21, 1985 at 3
(Gray submitted request to OMB and to the House appropriations committee asking for more bank
examiners); see also Final Oversight Hearings on the Savings and Loan Industry in the 100th Cong.
Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 164-65 (1988)
(prepared statement of Edwin J. Gray, former Chairman, Federal Home Loan Bank Board).
43. See S&L Crisis, supra note 42.
44. See Impact on FDIC, supra note 42, at 52-56.
45. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); Nash, Conferees Agree on
Savings Bailout Bill N.Y. Times, July 28, 1989, at Dl, col. 3 (House and Senate agree on $166
billion bailout of savings and loan industry).
46. SEC Reauthorization, 1989: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Fi-
nance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce 101st. Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1989) (statement of
SEC Chairman David Ruder) [hereinafter SEC Reauthorization Hearing].
47. Id. at 11.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 13-14.
50. See id. at 11, 15.
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monitor it, then activity that endangers investor confidence in the finan-
cial marketplace is bound to flourish.
The events of October 19, 1987, Black Monday, came as a surprise
to many.51 But the handwriting was on the wall long before October 19,
and the lesson is the same with FSLIC. The real question is not whom to
blame, but who pays in the long run?
The particular examples that I have used so far52 are illustrative
generally of problems caused by the deregulatory drive, but there is no
better example in the Reagan era than the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion (NRC). The Reagan and Bush era and their effect on the NRC can
best be described by paraphrasing a quote by President John F. Ken-
nedy:53 The NRC has weakened any regulation, changed any rule, be-
friended any utility and ignored the health and safety of every citizen to
keep this nation's nuclear power plants running. This was the record of
the NRC under the Reagan Administration and it continues under Presi-
dent Bush. Staffed with ideological zealots, the NRC has become wed-
ded to the Reagan and Bush Administrations' nuclear policies.
This corruption of the NRC was clearly demonstrated in the case of
the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant. In a monumental mistake, this plant
was sited virtually on top of the beach in Seabrook, New Hampshire. 54
Over eighty percent of New Hampshire is forested and underpopulated, 55
but the nuclear power plant was built in the middle of the only populated
area, on a beach, with just one two-lane road to evacuate, in the event of
an accident, a population that by some estimates reaches 300,000 in the
summer months. 56 In the event of an accident or meltdown, research has
proved that it would be impossible to evacuate the citizens who live
within the ten-mile radius of the plant.57
51. See Business Digest: Tuesday, October20, 1987 N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1987, at D1, col. 1
(city ed.).
52. The EPA, FSLIC, the Vice President's Task Force, and the SEC.
53. See PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JOHN F. KENNEDY,
1961, at 1 (1962) (Inaugural Address). "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that
we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to
assure the survival and success of liberty."
54. See D. STEVER, SEABROOK AND THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 52-58 (1980)
(maps showing the geography and population distribution surrounding the site).
55. See RAND McNALLY, COMMERCIAL ATLAS AND MARKETING GUIDE 72, 76 (1986); 29
THE NEw ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTANICA MACROPAEDIA: KNOWLEDGE IN DEPTH 283 (1989).
The urban centers, where 52% of the population lives, are all located south of the white Mountains
in the south and southeastern regions of the state-all within roughly 60 kilometers of Hampton
Beach. Id.
56. See Kittredge, Seabrook Evacuation Plan for N.H. OK'd, Boston Globe, Jan. 3, 1989, § 1, at
1, col. 5.
57. See D. STEVER, supra note 54, at 66-67, 70-74 (beach's isolation from transportation corri-
dors and the difficulty of traveling in and out from the beach make evacuation plans difficult to
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Both Massachusetts and New Hampshire have spent hundreds of
thousands-if not millions-of dollars trying to design adequate emer-
gency response plans. Regulations were adopted after Congress passed
legislation that required emergency evacuation planning-effectively giv-
ing state officials veto power over nuclear plant operation if they cannot
adequately provide for the safety of their citizens. The first time a state
reached that conclusion, the NRC changed its regulations. The Reagan
NRC was so determined to get Seabrook and Shoreham on line that it
changed the rules on emergency evacuation planning after the states had
already invoked their rights under the existing regulations. 5
Current statutes require that the NRC base its licensing decisions on
safety.59 Economics and cost balancing are not mandated by the law.
The utilities now claim that the inexorable pressure of an unwise invest-
ment made twelve years earlier should override any and all safety consid-
erations. According to proponents, compelling economic necessities
mandate that the plant should be licensed and regulations to the contrary
should be waived; state reliance upon these regulations is now deemed
irrelevant.
Thus, even after the accident at Three Mile Island (and Chernobyl)
and in spite of the consensus that public safety concerns mandated
greater protection, the Reagan NRC tried to block public participation in
the rulemaking process in order to accommodate the nuclear industry.6°
Instead of limiting public participation in the decisionmaking process, a
better approach would have sought to foster a working relationship with
the communities in which the plants operate.
On the floor of the House in August of 1987, I opposed ignoring the
emergency organization planning question and I set forth my opposition
by way of a proposed amendment. 61 My amendment was very simple-
do not change health and safety rules to fit a dangerous site. Change the
site to fit the rules. The amendment lost after heavy lobbying efforts
formulate); see also J. PRicE, THE ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT 89-90 (rev. ed. 1990) (the Federal
Emergency Management Agency twice rejected evacuation plans and found serious deficiencies dur-
ing a mock evacuation).
58. See Exec. Order No. 12,657, 3 C.F.R. §§ 611-614 (1989). For a discussion'of the costly
delays resulting from Shoreham's inadequate emergency evacuation plans, see . ToMAN, NUCLEAR
POWER TRANSFORMATION 47-51 (1987).
59. See Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1988); National Environmental Policy
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4335 (1988); see also 10 C.F.L § 2 app. A (1990); 10 C.F.RL § 51 subpart A
(1990).
60. Exceptions to Notice and Comment Rulemaking Procedures, 50 Fed. Reg. 13006 (1985) (to
be codified at 10 C.F.R. § 2) (final rule creating exceptions to 10 C.F.R. § 2, asserting the Commis-
sion's discretion to make exceptions to the general requirements for public notice and opportunity
for comment on rulemaking).
61. See 133 CoNG. REc. H7156, 7162 (daily ed. Aug 5, 1987) (statement of Rep. Markey).
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against it.62 I imagine that many utility executives called their Congress-
person on this issue. It serves as an example of the economic and polit-
ical power of the utility lobby prevailing over public safety.
Under President Bush, the NRC licensed Seabrook's opening, but
the dispute will continue and probably will be litigated to the Supreme
Court. Once again, the federal courts will be required to examine the
proper deference owed by the executive branch to congressional policy
choices. The fundamental question presented by the Seabrook licensing
dispute is the ability of federal agencies--independent agencies-to play
games with regulations that have been relied upon by states and
Congress.
And finally, as the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy Con-
servation and Power over the years, I can tell you with complete confi-
dence that Congress intended safety to be foremost on the NRC agenda.
Safety-based standards were Congress' deliberate response to the Atomic
Energy Commission, which had failed to discharge its responsibilities as
a regulator and had instead become a promoter of nuclear power. Con-
gress established the NRC as a separate agency just to address the issue
of safety. Nevertheless, the NRC ignored that agenda. The agency once
again became captive to the very parties from whom we had sought to
free the agency.
My responsibilities in overseeing the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) have taught me similar lessons about the dangers of ad-
ministrative agencies gone haywire. Through the Nixon, Ford and
Carter years, a consensus developed on the need for sound, sensible regu-
lations. It did not make a lot of difference whether it was a Democratic
or Republican administration. People tried to work collectively to pro-
duce policy decisions that reflected consensus. But, with the elevation of
Mark Fowler to the chair of the FCC in 198163 and his statement that a
television is nothing more than a toaster with pictures,64 the congres-
sional leadership realized that he would not have the same view as we do
of the role technology plays in shaping values.
There is a balance that must be struck between the free market and
the unintended consequences of the free market. When the FCC decided
62. 133 CONG. REC. H7156, 7158 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1987) (vote 160 ayes to 261 nays, Roll No.
309).
63. Holsendolph, Frr- Change Promised, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1981, at D2, col. 5 (Fowler
sworn in as new F.C.C. Chairman).
64. Mayer, FCC's Chief's Fears FowlerSees Threat in Regulation, Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 1985, at
K6, col. 4. For a general news account of the complexities of communications deregulation, see
Boyer, The Media Busine." The Hard Issue of Opening Cable TV to the Baby Bells, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 28, 1988, at D14, col. 1 (city ed.).
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in 1987 to repeal the fairness doctrine,65 we began to realize that even
though Congress had voted 302 to 102 to maintain the rule,66 there was
an ideological agency agenda that sought to override popular support for
the doctrine. This conservative agenda would lead the FCC to pursue
deregulation in the face of broad-based Democratic and Republican con-
gressional consensus in opposition.
The decision to vitiate the fairness doctrine was as shocking on pro-
cedural grounds as it was as a matter of substance. In 1986, Congress
attached a rider to an appropriations bill that ordered the FCC to pro-
vide a report to Congress on alternative methods of enforcing the fairness
doctrine before acting to repeal it67 -an action Congress clearly antici-
pated' Early the next year, the House and Senate voted to maintain the
fairness doctrine, an action subsequently vetoed by President Reagan. 6
Yet on August 4, 1987, the FCC reported to Congress that there were no
constitutionally permissible alternatives to the fairness doctrine.69 And
on the same day, before this report could even be physically placed into
the hands of congressional overseers, the FCC voted to abolish the fair-
ness doctrine.70 In one fell swoop an agency abrogated a forty-year-old
doctrine that had overwhelming support in Congress and in doing so,
ignored congressional procedural requirements for such an action. This
lack of respect for Congress is a surefire scenario for outright war on the
Hill. 7 '
Both the Reagan and Bush administrations have witnessed great
confrontations between Congress and administrative agencies. The great
battles of this time have been characterized by instances of rigid adher-
ence to an ideological agenda by administrative agencies, which in turn
has created countervailing pressures for rigidity by a Congress that views
its legal mandates under attack. When Congress is faced with the direct
and heavy-handed undermining of its intent-whether expressed clearly
65. The fairness doctrine is a 40 year old rule that sought to ensure that the public would have
access to the airwaves to discuss important public policy issues. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-77 (1969) (tracing the origins of the fairness doctrine).
66. 133 CONG. REc. H4159 (daily ed. June 3, 1987) (recording vote on fairness doctrine).
67. H.R.J. Res. 738, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H10,599 (1986).
68. S. 742, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S8438 (daily ed. June 23, 1987) (President's
Message to Congress Regarding Veto of S. 742, The Fairness in Broadcasting Act).
69. See 133 CONG. REc. H7205 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1987) (Executive Communication No. 1906
from the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission evaluating the fairness doctrine).
See also 133 CONG. REC. S11529 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1987) (comments of Senator Hollings condemn-
ing the FCC's evaluation of the fairness doctrine); Johnson & Mansinerus, Ideas & Trend4" FCC
Decides to End the Reign of The Fairness Rule N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1987, § 4, at 7, ol. 1.
70. See Johnson & Mansinerus, supra note 69.




or ambiguously-Congress must respond in the strongest fashion possi-
ble. Congress has responded with heightened use of the most prominent
weapons in the congressional arsenal: oversight hearings, strongly-
worded letters, and press conferences. The difficult process of legislation
becomes even more hazardous when Congress and the executive branch
are controlled by competing parties.
Despite recent battles, no one prefers interbranch warfare as the
standard method of congressional interaction with administrative agen-
cies. Many members of Congress-in conjunction with our role as over-
seers-would like to work as partners with the administrative agencies.
This is best exemplified through my recent experience with the SEC on
the issue of market reform legislation.
The history of the market reform issue traces back to the 508 point
crash of October 1987.72 In the aftermath of that crash, the Reagan Ad-
ministration appointed a Presidential Commission-the Presidential
Task Force on Market Mechanisms-to examine its causes and recom-
mend appropriate remedial measures. 73 The Chairman of that Commis-
sion, Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, reported that the lack of an
answer for the tenuous regulatory condition of our financial markets has
the United States "looking down the barrel [of a gun], and the gun is still
loaded." 74 Among other things, the Brady Commission recommended a
single regulator-such as the Federal Reserve Board (Fed)-for all se-
curities and securities-related products, emergency authority at the Fed
to shut down markets in highly volatile times, and greater regulatory
authority for the Fed to examine the financial condition of companies
associated with broker-dealers. 75 I introduced legislation to implement
many of these recommendations and similar authority was sought by the
SEC. But the Reagan Administration refused to support the conclusions
of its own Brady Commission. 76
Two years and another October crash later, the SEC today has be-
come the strongest partner in our Subcommittee's effort to enact market
reform legislation. Initially, the position of the Administration with re-
72. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
73. See Exec. Order No. 12,615, 3 C.F.R. § 258 (1988); Sterngold, Stock Plunge Leads to Look
at the Safety Net; N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
74. Hinden, Brady Says Markets Need One Regulator, Wash. Post, Mar. 18, 1988, at B1, col. 1.
75. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS 69 (1988). See
also Vise, Market Plunge Wipes Out New Year's Rally: Presidential Commission Urges United Stock,
Futures Agency, Wash. Post, Jan. 9, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
76. H.R. 4997, Securities Market Reform Act, 134 CONG. REC. E2285 (daily ed. July 7, 1988)




gard to the final legislative package was unsettled, 77 but the SEC, under
its Chairman Richard Breeden, has adopted an independent stance. 78
The SEC's current policies are divorced from the rigid free-market ideol-
ogies of the last administration. This position is necessary if the agency
wants to pursue meaningful reform. The SEC and I still will have our
differences with regard to a range of other matters. However, on the
critical question of market stability, the SEC in its own independent as-
sessment of the needs of the marketplace agrees strongly with the prevail-
ing view in Congress that the SEC needs important new legislative
authority. After Congress adopts a reform package, I hope I am still able
to speak so positively about the SEC's role in promulgating the necessary
implementing regulations.
In summary, let me emphasize again that Congress will, whenever
possible, seek to assert its views in the administrative law arena. I think
that such efforts are not only constructive, but also necessary to the most
efficacious functioning of our administrative agencies. All three branches
have to exist in this government together. If Congress and administra-
tive agencies view each other as partners, rather than as mortal enemies,
we can avoid a repeat of the grave mistakes of the last decade. Both
Congress and the agencies can move forward together to reduce a most
frightening danger-rampant legal ambiguity.
77. Subsequently, the Market Reform Act of 1990 was enacted into law. Pub. L. No. 101-432,
104 Stat. 963 (1990) (codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C and 12 U.S.C.).
78. See Vise, Beyond Crisis Management: SEC Chief Breeden Hopes to Ease Way for Invest-
ment Stock Purchases Abroad, Wash. Post, Dec. 3, 1989, at Hl, col. 2 (Breeden has spent hours on
the phone negotiating market reform legislation with Representatives Markey and Rinaldo (R-NJ)).
See. eg., Cranford, Panels Target Wide Swings in Stock Market Prices CONG. Q., Mar. 10, 1990, at
728, 730 (Breeden told the Senate Banking Committee on March 2, 1990, that market-reform provi-
sions-such as restricting program trading, emergency market closings, reporting of large trades,
and SEC regulation of clearing and settling of secured transactions-were "essential in order to
know whether a liquidity crisis is imminent.").
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